The Supreme Court and the Future of Agency Independence

Under current law, commissioners at independent federal agencies serve fixed terms and can be removed by the President only “for cause,” meaning for specific reasons such as misconduct or serious performance failures, not simply because the President disagrees with their policy views. For nearly a century, these protections, upheld in the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor, have been the backbone of agency independence, which has allowed experts to enforce laws and regulations without constantly looking over their shoulders at the White House. Congress designed this system to strike a balance: protecting agency leaders from arbitrary presidential dismissal while still allowing removal for clear misconduct or incapacity. This balance is now under attack. Recent Supreme Court decisions have cast doubt on whether these removal protections are constitutional at all, and President Trump has acted aggressively, removing Democratic commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and attempting to oust Federal Reserve (Fed) governor Lisa Cook. These actions have resulted in two major cases this term—Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook—where the Court has the opportunity to either uphold the independence of these agencies or significantly reduce their autonomy by placing them under direct presidential control.