A key under the doormat isn’t safe. Neither is an encryption backdoor.

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[Commentary] Cryptography, when used properly, is a critically important tool for securing data on the notoriously vulnerable networks that we rely on for almost every aspect of daily life. But law enforcement agents have expressed concern that cryptography might sometimes work too well, thwarting investigators from extracting useful evidence from wiretaps, smartphones and computers. They call for encryption systems to be designed with special backdoor access features that would allow the government to decrypt data when it is needed for an investigation. The cryptography debate is often portrayed as a zero-sum game pitting law enforcement against privacy -- our individual right to be free from unwarranted intrusion by the government. Put this way, reasonable people might disagree on where balances should be struck and lines should be drawn, and we rely on the political process to find compromises, however imperfect, that we can all live with. But lost in this framing is the reality that cryptography and security are not just political issues, but also deeply difficult technical ones.

Reliable, robust security -- which means cryptography unencumbered by an extra key “under the doormat” -- is not just a privacy nicety, but also a matter of national security and public safety. New technology certainly can create new challenges for law enforcement personnel, but they should be careful about the solutions they wish for. Our adversaries may want exactly the same thing.

[Matt Blaze is an associate professor in the Computer and Information Science Department at the University of Pennsylvania]


A key under the doormat isn’t safe. Neither is an encryption backdoor.