by
Harmeet Sawhney

Abstract: The recent proliferation of telecommunications services has turned the idea of universal service into a serious problem because there is little consensus about what should constitute a "bare essential" package. Scholars have sought to develop a new definition for universal service which can provide a framework for formulating appropriate public policies. The analysis presented in this article suggests that this approach is a misdirected effort. In the United States, incremental processes are likely to have a greater chance of success than those based on a master plan.

Since the divestiture of AT&T, universal telecommunication service has been discussed from a number of angles. Some researchers have focused on the historical development of this concept (Dordick 1990; Hills 1989; Lavey 1990; Mueller 1993). Others have studied the impact that unavailability of universal service would have on society, focusing on the stratification of society between the "information rich" and the "information poor" (Bowie 1990; Hudson and Parker 1990; Pressler and Schieffer 1988). Recently, the focus has shifted towards creating a new definition of universal service (National Telecommunications and Information Administration [NTIA] 1991; Pacific Bell 1988).

The problem of formulating appropriate universal service policies was relatively simple when the telephone networks provided only voice communication. The challenge then was to extend the network in such a manner that the entire population was served. The biggest problem was the cost involved. The solution was found in an elaborate set of internal subsidies between long-distance and local rates that enabled the extension of telephone service to almost the entire U.S. population. However, the recent proliferation of telecommunications-based services has made the issue of universal service very complicated. In a situation where there is a wide range of services, it is extremely difficult to develop a consensus about what should constitute a "bare essential" package. Though there is very little disagreement on the necessity of providing enhanced 911 emergency services on a universal basis, the discord becomes severe with other services, such as home banking, distance learning, remote medical diagnostics, surveillance, energy management, special services for the hearing-impaired, automatic language translation, voice mail, computer conferencing, and access to databases.

There is general agreement that the definition of universal service needs to be extended beyond basic voice communication (Gillan 1986; Hadden 1991a, 1991b; Information Infrastructure Task Force 1993; NTIA 1988, 1991; O'Connor 1991; Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] 1990; Parker, Hudson, Dillman, and Roscoe 1989; Williams 1991). Scholars and policy-makers have accordingly focused their attention on the redefinition of universal service. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) suggests that expanded basic service should include touch-tone, emergency communication services (e.g., 911), services for the hearing-impaired, and equal access to competitive long-distance carriers (NTIA 1991). Others have sought to include voice, video, and data in the redefined universal service (O'Connor 1991; Pacific Bell 1988; Williams 1990). Some have even suggested that redefined universal service should include access not only to communications networks but also to information services (Dordick 1991; Williams and Hadden 1991). Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt at redefining universal service was made by California's Intelligent Network Task Force (Pacific Bell 1988). The Task Force redefined universal service as affordable access for virtually all citizens to: (1) the intelligent network1; and (2) a package of essential services that includes touch-tone service, access to emergency services, access to public information services, access to educational services, services for customers not fluent in English, and services for persons with disabilities.

The Task Force recommendations are fairly detailed and specific, and they have a ring of something definite about them. However, the definitions proposed by the Task Force and others are rather arbitrary in nature because they are not based on any theoretical rationale for including some services and excluding others. The selections are essentially made on the basis of good judgment. At best, the Task Force recommendations and other such attempts serve an illustrative purpose by providing a sense of what should be included in redefined universal service. They have failed to facilitate the emergence of a consensus. Yet the lack of success to date has not dampened efforts. A new definition is still considered to be the key piece of the universal service puzzle.

There is little indication that a more intensified effort in the current direction will lead to a resolution of the universal service problem. We need to reassess the basic assumptions underlying the current debate and explore alternate ways of framing the issue of universal telecommunication service. The analysis in this article approaches the issue within telecommunications by looking at how similar situations were tackled in the case of universal education, universal telephone service, and other such "universal" services. The study also includes universal suffrage which, though not a "service," is a principle that created the foundation for the provision of other services on a universal basis. This study is based on the logic that it is not the first time that society has been faced with the problem of providing a service to all its citizens. The repertoire of past experience is a useful resource, and elements drawn from the past can have a heuristic value for devising creative solutions that might provide a conceptual breakthrough. This article adopts an innovative approach to overcome the shortcomings of the past attempts that have suffered from a narrow focus on telecommunications technologies. Limited experience with the emerging technologies and the resulting paucity of data have constricted the development of an appropriate conceptual framework for analyzing universal service issues. In this article, the net has been cast very wide.

The main thesis of this paper is that the development of universal service is primarily a function of politics, economics, and social values. The specific characteristics of a particular technology or service are of secondary importance. The problem is fundamentally the same whether the service under consideration is education, electricity, or telecommunications. Therefore, there is a great deal of consistency in the way society resolves the question of providing a service on a universal basis. In other words, although the specifics of each individual situation are different, there is a pattern which underlies the development of universal service within society. An understanding of this pattern can aid the formation of a conceptual framework that would be most appropriate for analyzing universal service issues in the telecommunications arena.

The article is organized into four sections. The first part of the analysis deals with the public posturing by the different players. The discussion highlights the themes that have recurred in the rhetoric of universal service. The second part of the analysis examines their actual motives and reveals a wide chasm between rhetoric and reality, where different groups supported universal service only when it furthered their private agendas. At the same time, the hypocritical "talk" has served a useful purpose because it was a combination of "talk" and motives that made the achievement of the ideal -- universal service -- possible. The third part focuses on the role of competition and the impetus it provides for making the service ubiquitous. Finally, the implications of this analysis are discussed to throw some light on the current debate over universal service for telecommunications.

The "talk" about universal service

The discourse about universal service takes place at three levels -- individual, social system, and humanity. At the individual level, the discussion is on the welfare and rights of each individual human being. The discourse on the social system level deals with the benefits to the society as a whole. The relationship between universal service and humanity is complex and therefore the discourse is not well articulated. The discussions range from religious to secular hopes for human unity. The recurring themes in these conversations are discussed below.

Universal service and the individual

We find similar appeals for the provision of education, electricity, and medical coverage on a universal basis. In the mid-1800s the masthead of the Working Man's Advocate read, "all children are entitled to equal education; all adults to equal privileges" (Binder 1974, p. 33). The argument here was that universal education is a necessary requirement for modern life. In 1925 this sentiment reappeared in a speech by L.J. Taber, master of National Grange, who saw electricity as a basic right and therefore implored the electric utilities "to render conspicuous service to humanity and to bring Electrical Sunshine to all American homes, and with it the confidence that the rights of the humblest citizens are being protected" (Nye 1990, p. 301). Today, the concern about universal medical coverage is generating similar pleas. The individual rights argument was well articulated by Pope John XXIII, who wrote, in his 1963 encyclical, that all humans had "the right to bodily integrity and the means necessary for the proper development of life" (Mitchel 1993, p. 31). These "rights" have a weak foundation because their only basis lies in a moral argument. They are not enshrined in the constitution.

This line of reasoning provides an attractive argument for universal service because it sidesteps complex cost-benefit questions. Once access to a service is accepted as a right, the cost-benefit equation becomes a secondary consideration. The society is then obligated to extend the service to everyone irrespective of cost. This is why, at times, champions of universal service have chosen to pursue a rights-oriented strategy. For example, assemblywoman Gwen Moore adopted this strategy for her universal service campaign in California. She and her staff drafted legislation which asserted that access to a telephone was a basic right. The argument was grounded in a broad interpretation of the state constitution's "free speech" clause by the California Supreme Court (Jacobson 1989). The rationale for this strategy was that "if the freedom to communicate is a fundamental right, then access to the means of communication must also be a fundamental right. Without access, one cannot be a part of the telecommunicating community" (Jacobson 1989, p. 59).

Universal service and the social system

The system benefit argument is not unique to telecommunications networks. It was articulated most clearly in the debate over universal education. The American Monthly Magazine contended that "viewed in a political light, education is imparted, not for the sake of the recipients, but for the state of which they are members" (Jackson 1941, p. 63). The modern society is seen as a mechanism in which all the different parts have to work together. Therefore, it is in the interest of society that it educates all its members. "Where every individual thought and deed affected the social mechanism of the whole, it became the interest of the whole to provide the necessary education for its parts" (Ditzion 1947, p. 65). The rational logic devoid of all sentiment is that the benefit that accrues to the individual is almost incidental. "Why does the state take money from your pocket to educate my child? Not on the ground that an education is a good thing for him, but on the ground that his ignorance would be dangerous to the state" (Strong 1963, p. 99). Thereby the tax for universal service is not a levy on the rich for the benefit of the poor. It is the cost borne by the society for its own benefit (Carlton 1966).

The only major problem with the system benefit argument is that it is difficult to measure the benefits, but the costs, which are easily measured, are very large. The universal medical coverage debate provides one of the few instances where the cost of not providing universal coverage is very visible. The failure to provide universal medical coverage on a universal basis leads to the excessive use of expensive emergency care facilities. A person without coverage does not seek medical help when the disease or sickness is in its earlier stages. The problem continues to fester until it becomes acute and requires emergency treatment. At this stage, it becomes a matter of life and death, and a hospital is unable to turn away a patient who does not have the ability to pay. The hospital bears this cost, but then passes it on to the rest of the population that has medical coverage. The end result of this chain of events is that the final costs are much higher than the amount the rest of the population has to pay to subsidize coverage for those who cannot afford it.

In addition to the economic benefits, other social benefits also have the potential of enhancing the overall system. The new service is often seen as "a fairy wand of social reform" (Ditzion 1947, p. 24). Universal education was viewed as an antidote to poverty, intemperance, and social unrest. Rural electrification, which became "a symbol to save farmers," was expected to improve the quality of rural life and thereby stem the depopulation of rural areas (Nye 1990, p. 304). Similarly, the telecommunications infrastructure is now seen as the vehicle for moving our society into the information age. The envisioned benefits range from the generation of new economic activity to a more cost effective provision of education, medical, and other public services.

Universal service and humanity

The large-scale networks are a very visible feature of modern society. They undergird its institutions. Dependence on these networks is so extreme that an industrialized society is not able to function without them. Yet, people have always had an uneasy relationship with them. This uneasiness can be traced back to the time of the emergence of the networks. People who once lived in isolated households increasingly found themselves placed as little nodes on a number of networks -- sewage systems, water pipes, gas mains, hot-air ducts, electrical cables, telephone lines, and other systems. Although there was never any doubt that these networks enhanced the efficiency of day to day chores, they were disturbing because "unlike a sewing machine, a stove, or a washbasin, an electrical cable, a gas main, or a sewage pipe was not finite. Each disappeared into the wall or the ground and then was connected to an invisible network that spread beyond the home" (Handlin 1979, p. 452). These networks were objects of suspicion because they tied us to strangers. In a strange way, they connected isolated individuals in an increasingly fragmented society.

These networks also altered the private and public responsibilities in the life of the community. The public authority was cast over an expanding range of activities that were earlier left to the individuals. The affected areas included, among others, water supply, sanitation, street lighting, and education. "This substitution was full of significant implications for the common man in a society destined to become increasingly interdependent and insecure" (Curti 1964, p. 288). The telephone bridged the gap between the private and public spheres of an individual's life on a more immediate level. "The telephone was the first electric medium to enter the home and unsettle the customary ways of dividing the private person and family from the more public setting of the community" (Marvin 1988, p. 26). This new link had a disconcerting impact on our lives. The sense of unease continues today. It is aggravated by telemarketers and computer hackers, who have an opportunity to intrude into our private domains the moment we connect ourselves to the network. The impact of the telephone has been particularly powerful because the connections it creates have more to do with human interaction than the movement of materials or energy. The telecommunications networks are not mere conduits for transporting information. They are the symbolic threads that tie all of us together. Ironically, this sense of unity comes through physical connection with total strangers via technological systems. Jules Romains, the French writer, wrote about how the "anonymity of city life could be transcended as individuals used the experience of city life to build a common identity and to discover a common humanity" (Konvitz 1985, p. 140). The life on the network is similar to Romains' description of urban existence. The network creates a possibility of communication but does not necessarily lead to it. The isolated individuals are tied together, although there is little interaction between them. The situation is analogous to that of an individual in an anonymous crowd. The utilitarian and symbolic dimensions of telecommunication networks are fused together in a peculiar manner. The mechanistic aspect of the technology enables the transportation of messages, while the symbolic aspect fosters a sense of union. The roots of this dualism lie in the deep-seated cultural ideas about the nature of communication. The word "communication" has an interesting history. The words "communication" and "communion" share the same Latin root, communis. The original meaning of communication signified communion or shared participation in a common experience. The word had strong religious overtones (Czitrom 1982). In the late 17th century, the concept was extended to include exchange and transportation of information and materials. Later, the term was also used to refer to technologies which made exchange possible -- roads, canals, railroads, telegraph, and telephone (Williams 1976). This meaning of communication has a clear mechanistic orientation, while the original meaning -- communication as communion -- conjures up the imagery of oneness of humanity and union with God.

Universal service is an embodiment of this dualism. It is the technological means which makes communion possible. The larger the number of people reached, the greater is the scope of the communion. Therefore, there is virtue in ubiquity. It is no wonder that each major advancement in communication technologies has created a sense of miracle (Czitrom 1982). The birth of the telegraph had stirred deep religious emotions. "The electric telegraph promised a unity of interest, men linked by a single mind, and the worldwide victory of Christianity" (Czitrom 1982, p. 10). "Universal communication" became the catchword of the times. The religious discourse fused technology with the idea of communion, and the telegraph was seen as "the wonderful vehicle" for transforming the condition of man. For example, the establishment of telegraph connections with Europe in 1857 had a great impact on the American imagination (Pacey 1990). The clerics saw God's guiding hand in the unfurling of this momentous development. The poets called it "a loving girdle round the earth" (Field, 1898, p. 203). The optimism was universal. Even a secular source such as Scientific American (1881) celebrated the telegraph for fostering a "kinship of humanity" (Fischer 1992, p. 2). This euphoria can best be described as "organicist electric utopianism" (Thompson 1990, p. 67). The new technologies were perceived as holding the promise of "the Universal Brotherhood of Universal Man" (Carey 1989, p. 208).

This hope for oneness has lingered on and become a recurring theme in the discussions on new communication technologies. There is a cultural bias towards ubiquity that seems to be driving our thinking about communication technologies. It is no accident that grandiose claims were made for many communications technologies when they were still in their infancy. In 1838, Morse wrote that it would not be long before "the whole surface of this country would be channeled for those nerves which are to diffuse with the speed of thought, a knowledge of all that is occurring throughout the land; making in fact one neighborhood of the whole country" (Czitrom 1982, pp. 11-12). In 1878, Bell predicted that "cables of telephone wire would be laid under ground, or suspended overhead, communicating by branch wires with private dwellings, country houses, shops, manufactories... and a man in one part of the country may communicate by word of mouth with another in a different place" (Kingsbury 1915/1972, p. 90). This bias towards ubiquity is generic to all network technologies and not limited to telecommunications. However, it has not been limited to them. Walt Whitman, well-known poet, expressed the hope that the people will be united by a single railroad network which "covers all over with visible power and beauty" (Marx 1964, p. 224). Calvin Colton, a Massachusetts clergyman, thought that the railroads had the potential of reuniting "the human race that had been dispersed at the time of the building of the Tower of Babel" (Kohn 1957, p. 18). This discussion suggests that there is a natural connection between the craving for ubiquity and the desire for a communion.

Potpourri of motives

When we examine the discourse about universal service, it first appears that there is a very enlightened perspective on the part of humankind. The publicly espoused motives include the inalienable rights of every individual, the enhancement of the democratic process, and the betterment of humanity. A closer analysis, however, reveals that the desire for universal service did not flow from the goodness of the human heart. Rather, the groups involved supported universal service because it furthered their private agendas.

The development of universal education provides a particularly revealing illustration of this phenomenon. The biggest impediment to the realization of the educational ideals embraced in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution has been the dogged reluctance to "translate sentiments into appropriations" (Ditzion 1947, p. 10). The founding fathers showered many eminently quotable praises on the importance of widespread education for the functioning of a democracy. However, limited action was taken to appropriate the resources for achieving this ideal. The net result was that education languished for over a century. This drama was played out most explicitly in Indiana. In 1816 the state constitution directed its lawmakers to establish an educational system which would be "free and open to all." At the same time, it asked the lawmakers to delay the undertaking "until circumstances will permit" (Meyer 1965, p. 387). This qualifying clause provided a convenient loophole for less determined spirits, and the idealistic enterprise was put off for many years.

Eventually universal education did strike roots. It was driven by machinations of the myriad players who were pursuing their own interests with regard to education. As Katz (1968) points out, "the extension and reform of education in the mid-19th century were not a potpourri of democracy, relationalism, and humanitarianism" (cited in Button and Provenzo 1989, p. 94). The people agreed to pay taxes for a public school system because of other reasons. The 19th century ordinary Americans voted for universal education mainly because they wanted to neutralize the growing immigrant threat, most of whom were Catholics. A tax-supported public school was seen as the "principle digestive organ of the body politic" (Strong 1963, p. 89). It was expected to Americanize the newcomers. This xenophobic fear elicited the greatest support from the vast majority of Americans. Others had more narrowly defined interests. The propertied elite were apprehensive of the consequences of universal suffrage, which had become a reality during the Jacksonian era in spite of their bitter opposition. They were scared of what they insultingly called "mob rule." Their more euphemistic position was that "education could play an important role in reconciling freedom and order" (Kaestle 1983, p. 5). They wanted the masses to be educated so that they would exercise their newly won political rights in a responsible manner. Their greatest concern was that the masses conform to the existing system and not destabilize it. Finally, there was the rising class of industrialists who wanted trained manpower for their ever expanding factories.

It would be incorrect to deny the contribution of individuals who were fired by the ideals of enlightened democracy. They were, however, very few in number. Furthermore, only those who were able to co-opt others' agendas into ever-widening circles of "overlapping consensus,"2 were able to facilitate the emergence of universal service. They were coalition builders.

The businessmen and property-owners generally were approached in the name of their own protection. The warring sects of Christendom were appeased with Bible-reading in "non-sectarian" schools. The workingmen and shopkeepers, who asked for a better living and for a realization of their theoretically enjoyed "equal rights," were given some concessions and the advice that education rather than political action would lead them to the Promised Land. (Jackson 1941, p. 172)

Horace Mann, the great idealist and a practical coalition builder, best captured the essence of this struggle when he described universal education as the "balance wheel of the social machinery" (cited in Binder 1974, p. 64). Though a very odd metaphor to attach to a rather hallowed undertaking, it served as a symbol which could subsume the various agendas of the different groups.3

The development of universal telephone service is also cloaked in a myth that projects its evolution as a product of an egalitarian ideal. The regulatory compact between the erstwhile Bell System and the regulators is credited with making this ideal a reality. Also, Theodore Vail, the chief architect of the Bell System, is cast as the great visionary behind the universal service concept. His often quoted words, "one policy, one system, and universal service," are accepted as a statement of an enlightened business philosophy. This story-line is, at best, full of half-truths (Mueller 1993).

In 1907, Vail first used the term "universal service" to emphasize the need for a monolithic system that would allow a subscriber to talk to any other subscriber. The vision of "universal service" was presented as an alternative to the existing fragmented telephone networks which lacked interconnection. He championed "universal service" as an ideal because it furthered his "drive to achieve political support for the elimination of competition and the establishment of regulated monopoly" (Mueller 1993, p. 365). The concept did not refer to geographic ubiquity or provision of service to the entire population. The evolution was slow and gradual. Oettinger very succinctly describes the process leading to the development of universal service:

AT&T's Theodore Vail spoke about the idea of universal service around 1907. The idea was written into the preamble of the Communications Act of 1934, but there is very little legislative history on why and how it got in there. And, even though the words were grand, nothing really happened until around 1945. By then, penetration of telephones, which you described as being almost 95 percent these days, was only about 40-50 percent. So after 40 years of rhetoric, universal service as we now know it came into place somewhere between 1945 and the early 1960s, by which time we had begun to dismantle the apparatus which brought it to us in the first place. (Oettinger quoted in National Governors' Association 1988, p. 1)

The universal service concept took on an egalitarian color during the 1960s when competition and antitrust law suits threatened to unravel the Bell System. The potential danger to universal service now became a convenient defense for the preservation of the Bell System.

This analysis suggests that there is rarely any direct correspondence between rhetoric and the actual agendas of the different players whose actions influence the development of universal service. The discrepancy between publicly stated ideals and actual motives deserves a closer look.

The use of hyperbole has always been a consistent feature of political discourse. As Edelman (1964) points out, "if politics is concerned with who gets what, or with the authoritative allocation of values, one may be pardoned for wondering why it need involve so much talk" (p. 114). The reality is that "talk" greases the wheels of the resource allocation process and ensures acquiescence on the part of the general population. Verbose rhetoric is a necessary feature of political life, and "the employment of language to sanctify action is exactly what makes politics different from other methods of allocating values" (Edelman 1964, p. 114). Therefore, the public policy formation process can be described as a "historically determined discursive practice, as a way of doing things with talk" (Streeter 1986, p. 39). Furthermore, politics is a peculiar process which "begins in conflict and eventuates in a solution. But the solution is not the 'rationally best' solution, but the emotionally satisfactory one. The rational and dialectical phases of politics are subsidiary to the process of redefining an emotional consensus" (Lasswell 1962, p. 185). In the case of universal service, the fusion of idealistic "talk" and private gain makes the emergence of an emotional consensus possible.

Competition over a quilted topography

The fragmented nature of the peculiarly American sociopolitical terrain gives a spin to the interplay of competitive forces. The political landscape is divided over 90,000 governmental jurisdictions which include 50 states, more than 3,000 counties, and many cities, villages, and townships, which are further balkanized into special jurisdictions for administering water supply, sewage disposal, pollution control, highways, harbors, schools, hospitals, airports, police planning, zoning, parks, charities, and many other services (Zelinsky 1973). Here, each political unit serves as a laboratory or a crucible for social experimentation where a unique set of circumstances often leads to a successful innovation. The competitive pressures then force other political units to follow suit. The development of universal suffrage provides an excellent illustration of this incremental process.

Universal suffrage was neither granted to U.S. citizens by benevolent founding fathers, nor was it bestowed in any single act of great magnanimity. Instead, it was extended in a very piecemeal manner as a result of a protracted struggle between competing political interests. A democracy is in many ways a game of numbers -- the side with the largest number of votes emerges as the winner. In a situation of limited democracy, where the suffrage is restricted, the numbers game can be influenced by expanding the population base of eligible voters. This possibility of manipulation has frequently led to fraudulent practices. When voting privileges were restricted to freeholders, "the practice of creating freeholds at the time of a crucial election was fairly widespread in the American colonies. When an office seeker and his friends thought an additional number of votes was necessary to win an election, it was not unusual for them to create small freeholds for the express purpose of manufacturing votes" (Williamson 1960, p. 50). The other remedy was to ease the restrictions on suffrage so that a more favorably disposed population could be included in the voter pool. In Pennsylvania, the Quaker party used naturalization of aliens as the means of enlarging its voter base (Williamson 1960). The Midwestern states extended suffrage to foreigners for economic reasons -- to "attract immigrants from other states to her unplowed fields" (Porter 1918/1969, p. 18). As Porter (1918/1969) points out, "the philosophy of suffrage has always been more or less opportunistic, if the word is permissible. Suffrage qualifications are determined for decidedly materialistic considerations, and then a theory is evolved to suit the situation" (p. 4).

Once a new more liberal standard was set in a particular region, it created pressure for other regions to also loosen their franchise restrictions. The quilted nature of the American political topography greatly accelerated the process. For example, in the 1770s Vermont was the first state to separate property or tax-paying considerations from the right to vote. However, "the dropping of the tax-paying qualification was perhaps not exclusively the result of democratic convictions" (Williamson 1960, p. 98). The newly formed state did not have a tax-collecting machinery, and therefore a tax-paying qualification would have disenfranchised everybody. Later, as the state developed, a number of factors worked against the introduction of tax-paying qualification (Williamson 1960). The establishment of this liberal principle in Vermont created pressure for change in New Hampshire, which soon discarded her tax-paying clause (Porter 1918/1969). The other states also succumbed to the pressure with the passage of time. As Binder (1974) notes, "by 1850 twenty-seven states had adopted universal manhood suffrage, six had a small tax qualification, and only North Carolina continued to maintain a significant property tax" (p. 7). It was only a matter of time before North Carolina gave in to the pressures of the times.4

Universal suffrage spread in an incremental manner with developments in one state influencing those in others. "The gathering sentiment from year to year, modified and influenced in one state by the actions in others, would finally gain complete expression on the convention floor and be recorded in a new constitution which in turn would influence and modify the tendencies in the neighbor states" (Porter 1918/1969, p. 18). The unrolling of universal suffrage was a series of compromises and political compacts which had very little to do with the espoused ideals. These negotiated interim compromises offered temporary advantages to different players and hence provided motivations for extending suffrage. Each step forward opened new doors, thereby creating a snowballi effect. The entire experience has very aptly been described as the "strange phenomenon of suffrage being carried forward on a tide of fallacies and specious doctrine" (Porter 1918/1969, p. 65).

The decentralized and incremental process described above is a unique feature of the U.S. federal structure which has often been celebrated as "laboratories of democracy." The process allows for trial-and-error and seat-of-the-pants pragmatism and thereby much innovation (Osborne 1990).

Discussion

The previous discussions on the role of "talk," motives, and competition reveal that there is a great deal of consistency in the way American society marshals its political will, emotions, and resources to attain the egalitarian ideal of universal service. There seems to be an archetypal pattern underlying the development of universal service in the United States that transcends the specifics of each individual service. The following discussion presents three generalizations that can be distilled from past experience and then examines their implications for the current debate.

Generalization 1: The publicly espoused ideals usually bear little correspondence with the actual motives of the different players. The public discourse is hypocritical, but it serves a useful purpose because the fusion of "talk" and motives creates the will for action. However, the momentum for extending a service to everyone builds only when there is an "overlapping consensus" or the convergence in the agendas of the different players.

Generalization 2: The quilted nature of AmericaÍs political topography provides varied arenas for the interplay of different actors and their agendas. The small and numerous political units facilitate innovation where each county and each state serves as a social laboratory. Once an innovation takes root in one county or state, it creates pressure for others to follow. The innovation spreads in a piecemeal manner, but the progress is rapid.

Generalization 3: The development of universal service is greatly accelerated by competition. Competitive impulses push the entities involved into making investments that they otherwise would hesitate to make. The county and state governments pour resources into infrastructure development so as to remain competitive with their regional rivals. The providers of commercial services go into areas that are not particularly profitable or cost-effective in an effort to grab unoccupied territory before others do. This dynamic facilitates the creation of a ubiquitous infrastructure or service.

Past experience with other services suggests that expanded universal service for telecommunications will eventually emerge out of an intensely contested process. As Anderson (1985) points out, "the American political and problem-solving style is incremental, not synoptic -- this country is wary of large-scale blueprints" (p. 280). This analysis leads one to believe that the current emphasis on the development of a new definition for universal service is a misdirected effort because it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to formulate a definition that will be acceptable to everybody. Even if it is possible to forge a universally acceptable definition, it will have limited utility in the political arena because different players are likely to pursue their own private interests in spite of their public support for the new definition of universal service.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the development of universal service does not hinge on enlightened choices but on effective coalition building. The redefinition of universal service, therefore, is not as important as the development of an "overlapping consensus" that hitches the pursuit of private gain to the creation of a public good. The "overlapping consensus" has more to do with a convergence of agendas and formation of coalitions than with an explicit agreement on a course of action. Here, the articulation of the ideal is of little relevance for the achievement of the ideal. The ambiguity and fuzziness of an ill-defined ideal is better suited for the emergence of an "overlapping consensus" because the different players can then see their individual benefits in their own interpretations of the ideal. Furthermore, the process will be incremental and not based on a grand plan -- a new definition of universal service.

Within the context of the phenomenon described above, a localized strategy is more likely to succeed because each state is, in effect, a social laboratory where a unique set of circumstances can lead to a conceptual breakthrough. The fragmented political landscape in the United States will serve as a natural test bed where different states will experiment with different strategies. The more successful innovations will be replicated by other states and the unsuccessful ones abandoned. Competition between different states will greatly accelerate the adoption of a new innovation. Every incremental expansion of the universal service package beyond the basic voice service in any one state will create competitive pressure on other states to follow suit. Thus, the proponents of universal service should attempt to accelerate this evolutionary process by directing their efforts to a few states that are most "vulnerable" to change. The competitive dynamic among the states will create momentum, and the innovation will spread across the nation.

The emerging competition between different service providers is another issue. Although conventional wisdom states that competition will undermine the provision of universal service, past experience suggests that we take a second look at the relationship between competition and universal service. As discussed earlier, the present universal telephone service is to a large degree a product of competition. The increased competition will help lower prices and make advanced telecommunications services affordable for the general population. At the same time, it must be realized that the marginalized population will continue to need subsidized access.

While these conclusions are congruous with the findings of the earlier research on interest group politics, there is a critical difference. Lowi (1969) very aptly described the policy-making process as a "parallelogram of forces" among groups where "the public interest is 'determined and established' through the free competition of interest groups" (p. 75). This phenomenon of interest groups influencing the development of communications policy has attracted much scholarly research. However, the focus of this literature has been on episodes where there appeared to be a collusion among the involved industry groups and political interests (Hazlett 1990; Leiserson 1942; Lowi 1969; Mosco 1982, 1989; Posner 1971; Schiller 1970, 1981, 1986; Schiller 1982; Streeter 1986; Wilson 1980). This body of literature suggests that the influence exerted by different interest groups typically leads to politically optimal solutions where each party gets rewards in proportion to their political influence (Cohen 1992; Hazlett 1990). These studies provide a good backdrop for the ideas discussed in this paper. In fact two key conclusions of this study are corroborated by other studies dealing with interest group politics. First, the need for incremental and localized policies has been discussed in the literature on interest group politics and a diverse range of other fields (Anderson 1985; Boorstin 1965; Krasnow, Longley, and Terry 1982; Martin 1986; Zelinsky 1973). Second, there has also been some discussion of how ambiguous concepts can play a unifying role. Krasnow and others. (1982) explain how the ambiguity of the "public interest" concept in broadcasting holds together the entire regulatory enterprise. The phenomenon described in this paper shares a similar dynamic but there is a key difference in terms of the linkage between the motivations of the different interest groups and the final outcome of the process. The different interest groups do not conspire to create universal service! The creation of universal service is an unanticipated outcome of the convergence in the agendas of different interest groups.

In terms of its philosophical orientation, this paper perhaps comes closest to the pluralist interest group tradition as represented by Krasnow and others (1982) in Politics of Broadcast Regulation. What is shared is a rather sanguine view of a policy-making process that is shaped by the interplay of political influence exerted by the different interest groups. The somewhat noncritical stance is more a result of a fascination for the process rather than an absolution of the use of high ideals for self-interested motives. Lowi (1969) would perhaps find the tolerance for the shenanigans of interest groups rather unbearable. He believed that democratic ideals flourished only when there was a citizenry that exercised its judgments as individuals. He felt that any group-based activity was a corruption of the democratic process. The Marxist scholars would interpret the findings of this study in an entirely different way. They would argue that the processes described in the paper are the very means by which the elites are able to impose their will over the rest of the population. Thus, we see that interpretations will vary according to the ideological perspective through which the findings of this study are viewed.5

The paper explains the processes that will lead to the development of universal service. The analysis is not normative in nature as the paper only explains how the process works and not how it ought to work. The phenomenon of interest here is instances where major social goals are accomplished because of the emergence of an "overlapping consensus" among the most unlikely groups. As the analysis in this study reveals, universal service usually emerges as an almost unanticipated byproduct of the machinations of different groups whose interests at times converge in such a way that a much eulogized public good becomes a reality. The main contribution of this paper is the explication of this process.

Notes

2) This term has been borrowed from Rawls (1985) who uses it in a very different context. In his work on political conceptions of justice, he argues that for justice to be perceived as fair, it must be supported by an "overlapping consensus," which he explains as "a consensus that includes all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional democratic society" (pp. 225-26). In other words, the system of justice should be based on the common ground or "overlap" between the different schools of thought within a society. It is only then that justice will be accepted as reasonable by all sections of society. In this paper "overlapping consensus" refers to the common ground or "overlap" in the agendas of the different players pursuing their own interests with regard to a new technology or service.

3) The other metaphors compared a schoolmaster to a constable, a school to a sentry box of liberty, and libraries to arsenals of democracy (Ditzion 1947; Jackson 1941).

4) In other situations the change often had roots in great bouts of hypocrisy. For example, Maine's decision to extend suffrage to its African-American population was not based on any sense of idealism. It resulted from a mixture of hypocrisy and calculated assessment of practical reality. The African-American population was a minuscule minority in Maine and therefore the "righteous men invoked high principles and lived up to them with punctilious consistency -- when doing so could not harm the community in the slightest degree. They took pride in being magnanimous when there was no harm in it" (Porter 1918/1969, p. 52). Although these moves by themselves were fairly hollow, they did set standards that pressured conformance from other states.

5) I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the anonymous reviewer whose comments have helped me situate the analysis presented in this paper within the existing literature on interest group politics.

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